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1   Introduction 
This policy workshop was organised as part of the research project, ‘Precautionary 
Expertise for GM Crops’ (PEG), funded by the European Commission.  The project 
includes research partners in seven member states (Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Spain and UK) and is co-ordinated by the Open University (UK). 
 
For regulating GM crops and their food uses, the precautionary principle has been widely 
accepted in Europe, but its meaning can be contentious. Indeed, it can have diverse 
meanings. The PEG project is analysing how current European practices – regulatory 
measures, expert bodies and stakeholder roles – compare with different accounts of the 
precautionary principle. How do these accounts inform policies and practices regarding GM 
crops?  And how do they facilitate (or impede) efforts to mediate conflicts? 
 
From the findings of the research, we will suggest: 
• how to clarify EU guidelines, so that they better reflect national regulatory measures, 
and so that decision-making procedures can be publicly accountable and scientifically 
defensible 
• how expert bodies could better accommodate public-scientific controversy within their 
judgements 
• how national practices could contribute to an EU-level precautionary expertise 
• how to enhance policy learning about these issues among users of the research 
findings. 
To achieve these aims, the project has involved stakeholders and policy-makers at an 
early stage of the research, in order to ensure that it is policy-relevant and incorporates 
emerging issues.  EU-level advisory panel meetings were held in Brussels in March and 
September 2002, to consult on the research plan and preliminary results.  Advisors were 
also consulted about how best to structure scenario-analysis exercises for the policy 
workshops. 
These workshops were held by national partners in their countries in early 2003.  Drawing 
upon those experiences, the project coordinator organised an EU-level workshop in July 
2003.  This report discusses the context, background, method, results and implications of 
that workshop.   
2   EU context 
For the EU and national workshops, an important reference point was the de facto 
unofficial moratorium.  In the EU Environment Council, many member states had declined 
to consider further requests for commercial authorisation since 1999.  According to 
declarations which they signed then, the EU must first adopt measures to ensure full 
traceability and labelling of GM crops across the agro-food chain, as well as more 
transparent risk-assessment procedures, based on precaution.  Some member states were 
imposing restrictions on GM products which had already gained EU approval.  Moreover, 
since the late 1990s most large food retail chains (and some processors) had largely 
blocked GM grain as an ingredient in their own-label products, though GM soya and maize 
were being widely used as animal feed.  In response to these pressures, the European 
Commission included more stringent measures when revising the Deliberate Release 
Directive; it also prepared entirely new legislation on traceability and labelling of GM food 
and feed.  
 
By 2003 there were signs that the moratorium would be lifted in the near future.  The week 
before our EU workshop, draft regulations on traceability and labelling of GM food had their 
second reading at the European Parliament.  If differences could be resolved between the 
Parliament and the common position (of the Commission and Council), then the 
regulations could come into force later in that year, thus satisfying the 1999 demands of 
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the Council.  Given widespread demands for measures to ensure co-existence of GM and 
non-GM crops, this issue was being addressed by proposals from the Commission and 
member states. 
 
Applications for commercial authorisation of additional GM crops were now going through 
the EU-wide decision procedure under the revised Deliberate Release Directive.  
Companies had updated their marketing applications to comply with its new requirements.  
By early 2003 these applications were circulating for comment among national Competent 
Authorities; summaries were available to the general public on a website of the European 
Commission.  However, uncertainty continued about how member states would respond to 
these applications, amid continuing public concerns about GM products.   
 
Meanwhile in May 2003 the USA led a challenge to the EU under the WTO’s disputes 
procedure, complaining about the EC’s moratorium which blocked approval of any 
additional GM products, as well as the EC’s failure to reverse national bans on some 
biotech products already approved by the EC.  This WTO challenge was nominally aimed 
at ending the de facto moratorium but could have the opposite effect, e.g. provoking 
European resentment which might cause further delays to commercial approval. (For more 
details on the EU context, see Appendices III and IV.) 
3   National workshops as background 
During early 2003, PEG research partners held national policy workshops to illuminate 
issues relevant to the regulation of GM crops, especially precaution.  Most were run as 
scenario-analysis exercises: the organisers and/or the participants formulated a set of 
plausible futures, as a basis to discuss ideas about possible causes and consequences for 
each future.  The aim was not to predict the future, but rather to identify underlying 
dynamics and issues which warrant attention.  The exercises presumed some national 
scope for influencing GM policy and decision-making, in the context of EU and international 
developments.  That basic format was adapted by each national partner in ways 
appropriate for attracting relevant individuals involved in the policy process around GM 
crops.  (The national workshop reports are available on the website of the Biotechnology 
Policy Group, Open University, http://www-tec.open.ac.uk/cts/peg/index.htm) 
 
3.1   Scenario-analysis exercises in general 
 
Scenario analysis has a long history.   Its development as an aid to strategic decision 
making is generally credited to the Royal Dutch/Shell Group, and in particular to Pierre 
Wack who directed Shell’s planning department during the 1970s (van der Heijden, 1996; 
Wack, 1985). Scenario analysis is especially useful for structuring discussions about 
uncertainties, whose potential impact is otherwise often ignored because they are regarded 
as too vague to consider.  Forecasting generally assumes that underlying trends will 
continue in a more or less linear way; by contrast, scenarios can help decision makers 
prepare for the surprises and discontinuities that inevitably occur. Compared with 
forecasting, scenario analysis is concerned less with predicting outcomes than with 
understanding the forces or drivers that lead to particular outcomes (Wack, 1985).  
 
Scenario analysis can serve a number of purposes. It can help users to: 
• bring unspoken assumptions into the open 
• incorporate creativity into rational analysis 
• anticipate and understand risks 
• explore and distinguish between predictable forces and uncertainties 
• organise apparently unrelated social, technological, economic, ecological and political 
information into a framework for decisions and judgements 
• question conventional wisdom 
• uncover new strategic options, and 
 5
• learn from each other’s experience and perceptions, so as to 
• reconsider and revise their assumptions about the world. 
Since the last two purposes are the most significant, the process is as important as the 
specific outcomes. 
Many accounts and guidelines of scenario analysis refer to examples within companies.  In 
general these have a clear strategic vision; there are relatively clear boundaries between 
the driving forces which lie within and outside the company’s control.  Guidelines have to 
be adapted if they are to be used for exploring government policy options, where various 
stakeholders seek to influence the outcomes. In general terms, the scenario is like a 
theatre set and opening scene in a play. It serves as a stimulus for imagining how the plot 
might unfold as a result of the interactions of the various characters.  
 
3.2   Scenarios on prospects for commercialisation 
 
For their workshop structure, some research partners (UK, NL, ES) decided beforehand to 
use scenarios which focused on prospects for commercialising GM crops. 
Commercialisation was chosen in order to focus discussion on key policy decisions, rather 
than assume that precaution would be a central issue.  Organisers formulated the following 
three scenarios: 
 
i. Moratorium continues (or Full stop to GM crops) 
ii. Limited commercialisation goes ahead 
iii. Full commercialisation goes ahead (or Full steam ahead) 
 
Those brief, ambiguous wordings left considerable scope for participants to develop their 
own meanings, in the context of the de facto moratorium.  The first scenario could mean no 
additional uses beyond the current ones, or no uses at all – i.e., more restrictive than the 
current situation.  ‘Full commercialisation’ could mean all uses which already had EU 
approval or, alternatively, all uses which were being requested for additional GM products.  
‘Limited’ could mean various limitations, resulting in commercial use somewhere between 
the other two scenarios.  In general the timescale was presumed to be the next few years – 
a period when the EU regulatory system would be deciding whether, or how, to go beyond 
the de facto moratorium.   
 
Each in its own way, the three workshops considered scientific uncertainties of GM crops 
and stakeholders’ views about how these should be regulated.  Discussions included 
efforts to clarify potential effects of such products before or during their commercialisation.  
Relevant effects included adventitious presence of transgenes, as well as environmental 
harm.  In some cases, participants acknowledged disagreements in interpreting the results 
of risk research.  However, they did not explicitly discuss ‘uncertainty’, much less 
‘precaution’, unless prompted by the organisers. 
 
Other research partners devised a different workshop structure, as described in Section 
3.3 for Germany and Section 3.4 for France. 
 
3.3   Scenarios on precaution 
 
In Germany the workshop organisers consulted prospective participants and eventually 
decided to emphasise precaution in the workshop structure.  Early on, they found that 
industry representatives were reluctant to attend a workshop, e.g. because they saw no 
way to go beyond the familiar polarised arguments with NGOs. But NGO representatives 
and administrators expressed interest in exploring the meanings of precaution, so the 
organisers successfully made special efforts to attract such individuals.   
 
For planning the workshop, the organisers formulated two different scenarios – ‘effective’ 
versus ‘comprehensive’ precaution.  However, when the workshop began, this terminology 
was criticised and was then changed by general consensus – to ‘weak’ versus ‘strong’ 
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precaution. Participants then analysed each of the three scenarios in terms of overall 
political direction, scientific and administrative procedure, and market rules. 
 
There was relatively greater consensus on how to characterise weak precaution.  This 
approach corresponded to the situation in the early 1990s in Germany, when government 
claimed to base regulatory policy on ‘sound science’, with national standard criteria.  There 
was less clarity or agreement about the shape of strong precaution.  Possible features 
included aspects already apparent in the Agrarwende – the recent policy of turning 
agriculture towards environmental and consumer concerns.  Such features could include: a 
greater burden of evidence upon operators to demonstrate safety, regional diversity of 
norms, and statutory regulation of co-existence. 
 
3.4   Scenarios on crop innovation 
 
In France too, the organisers consulted prospective participants and eventually decided to 
emphasise crop innovation in the workshop structure.  Early on, they realised that NGOs 
would be reluctant to focus on prospects for commercialising GM crops, partly because 
they sought a more diverse basis for crop innovation overall.  So eventually the organisers 
formulated this central question: ‘In a horizon of 15-20 years, describe the evolution of 
forms of governance for crop innovation.  What would be your ideal and nightmarish 
evolutions?’  As the organisers explained, the same scenario could be seen as either ideal 
or nightmare by different people.  This focus successfully attracted many participants, 
though mainly from NGOs and research institutes, despite the organisers’ efforts to attract 
participants also from government agencies and companies. 
 
The French workshop discussions resulted in three sociograms – institutional structures for 
directing crop innovation – along the following lines:   
 
i. Liberal-monopolistic: companies and shareholders subordinating R&D to the profit 
motive, while an oligopoly monopolises and standardises innovation.  
ii. Centralised, top-down:  a global body involving diverse actors who negotiate 
priorities for innovation, while delegating risk management to politicians. 
iii. Decentralised, bottom-up, self-managed:  international networks of local 
collectives, facilitating co-production of R&D with research institutes and peasant-
creators, etc. 
 
For most participants, those scenarios were perceived as part of a continuum from 
nightmare (i) to ideal (iii).   
4   EU workshop design 
The EU workshop drew upon various aspects of the national workshops, in order to devise 
a structure most appropriate for the EU-level policy process.  The title was based on 
several national workshops, especially the UK one: ‘GM Futures? Exploring Options for 
GM Crops in the EU’.  The invitation letter emphasised the main objective: to gain policy-
relevant insights into options for future decision making on GM crops in the EU.  A related 
objective was to explore the possible relevance of precaution for various regulatory issues. 
 
4.1   Timing and participants   
 
For our project timetable, we needed to hold the event around mid-2003.  As indicated by 
our conversations with prospective participants in Brussels, they had many other meetings 
and other work in late June, leading up to the second reading of draft GM regulations in the 
European Parliament plenary session in early July.  It was decided to hold the workshop on 
the Monday following that plenary session, when there would be fewer meetings, though 
some people might be unavailable for other reasons. 
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Invitations were sent to nearly a hundred people whose work relates to GM crop issues 
around Europe.  These included a wide range of policy actors – including Commission 
officials in Brussels, Competent Authorities in EU member states, other relevant people 
based not far from Brussels, and an expert network in Eastern Europe.  The invitation list 
was deliberately long because the organisers anticipated that many invitees would be 
unable to attend, for various reasons.   
 
In the event, 15 individuals took part.  Half were based in Brussels, and the others came 
from elsewhere in Europe.  They included officials from the European Commission and the 
European Parliament; national Ministries of Health, Environment and Food Safety; 
regulatory officers from industry; and academia (see Appendix I). There were several 
Commission officials but few centrally involved in policy-making on GMOs; reportedly those 
people had been over-worked by the draft GM regulations and US-EU WTO dispute.  No 
one attended from an NGO or farmer organisation, despite efforts to attract them.   
 
The event was managed by two professional facilitators, to ensure that the overall plan 
was smoothly followed and that the discussion resulted in a clear record which could be 
photographed.  Ten research partners of the PEG project acted as facilitators or note-
takers in the small-group discussions.  The discussions were held on the understanding 
that comments would not be attributed to a specific individual. 
 
4.2   Method and structure 
 
The organisers decided to focus the workshop on precaution, with the aim of generating 
ideas and debate on what that concept means.  In their introductory talks, Les Levidow and 
Patrick Rudelsheim surveyed possible meanings of precaution for regulating GM crops in 
the EU (see Appendix III).  The pre-circulated briefing document was entitled, ‘EU 
Regulation of GM Crops: What Role for Precaution?’ (see Appendix IV). 
 
The organisers also decided to structure the workshop in a relatively open-ended way, 
rather than formulate specific scenarios in advance.  One reason for this plan was a view 
that policy actors might be suffering from ‘scenario-fatigue’ and might therefore be reluctant 
to attend yet another workshop with this format.  A more open-ended workshop structure 
would allow the participants themselves to formulate possible policy futures.  In that spirit, 
discussion started with the following question:  ‘For GM crops and the implementation of 
the Precautionary Principle in the European Union, what are key elements of your ideal 
and nightmare futures?’  This question drew upon the ‘precaution’ emphasis from the 
German workshop, as well as the ideal/nightmare contrast from the French workshop.  The 
organisers intended that the key elements, as identified by participants, would then be 
combined into three different policy futures, as a basis for discussing their possible causes 
and consequences during the afternoon session of the workshop. 
 
The workshop took place in the following stages: 
 
i. Small-group discussion. After the introductory talks, participants were divided into 
three groups to generate elements of their ‘ideal’ and ‘nightmare’ futures. The main 
points were recorded on post-it notes. Then each group discussed how some 
elements could be combined into overall futures or wider issues (see Section 5).   
ii. Choice of thematic groups. Before breaking for lunch, participants indicated which 
issue or future they most wanted to discuss further. Each person ‘voted’ by putting 
a sticker onto the post-it note phrase which most interested them.  Three issues 
gained the most votes: multiple agricultures, regulations and legislation, and 
societal and consumer choice.  These then formed the basis of the afternoon’s 
activities. Participants selected which topic group to join. Many people wanted to 
discuss multiple agricultures, and few wanted to discuss societal and consumer 
choice, so some people volunteered to change groups.  
iii. Mapping causes and consequences. Each group then attempted to ‘map’ in a 
logical sequence the possible causes and consequences related to their topic (see 
Section 6).  In many cases, participants thought that the same factor could be both 
 8 
a cause and consequence, in different ways.  After completing the map, individuals 
were invited to discuss the implications for their own roles.  
iv. Carousel presentation.  A carousel approach was used to give each participant the 
opportunity to report back their group’s discussion to the participants of other 
groups. This was done by forming new groups containing one member from each 
of the previous groups.  These new groups took turns to visit each of the original 
groups’ diagrams, with the member common to both the new and the original 
group summarising their original group’s discussion of causes and consequences.  
Others had the opportunity to add comments or ask questions.   
Finally, Jan Staman closed the event with reflections on the day (see Appendix III). 
5   Post-it note session   
As explained above, participants were initially divided into three groups to generate 
elements of ‘ideal’ and ‘nightmare’ futures for GM crops.  The group discussions often 
reached consensus on how to classify various elements as either ‘ideal’ or ‘nightmare’.  
Perhaps consensus was relatively easy to achieve because few participants were opposed 
to GM products.   
 
Nightmare elements tended to be extremes – e.g. either blind trust or no trust in regulation, 
all GMOs or no GMOs, everyone polarised for or against GMOs, no choice for farmers or 
consumers, precaution ignored or mis-used.  According to some participants, it would be a 
nightmare if the organic lobby could dictate where GM crops are grown, or if various 
restrictions hindered R&D on such products.   
 
In one group, the facilitator led a process which grouped together some ‘ideal’ elements 
under the heading ‘Go’ and some ‘nightmare’ ones under the heading ‘Stop’.  This 
distinction implied that ideal elements would or should be linked to commercialisation of 
GM crops, while nightmare ones would be linked to blockages.  Ideal elements included 
the following: 
• Think about risks before authorisation of GMOs 
• Precautionary Principle  = identifying good questions 
• GMOs regarded in a global view (benefits/risks, current and future situation) 
• Paving the way for new GMOs 
• GMOs actuated and pesticides use declines 
• A better agriculture for sustainability 
• Solutions for local problems. 
In the same group, nightmare elements included the following: 
• Endless research without any decisions taken 
• Food producers reject all GMOs 
• GMOs will not help to feed the Third World. 
• Stop using GMOs 
• All R&D activity moves to US 
• Losing opportunities for progress. 
In the second group there was consensus on ‘co-existence’, as in current EU policy, but 
participants questioned why it should include only three categories of agriculture - GM, 
conventional and organic.  Participants thought an ideal future would need to 
accommodate more variety (see Section 6.1).  Ideal futures also included the development 
of beneficial GM crops, e.g. drought-resistant or medicinal types. 
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This group had strong disagreement about whether other elements should be classified as 
nightmare or ideal. Such elements included the following: 
• establishing global regulation of GM products or, alternatively, abandoning any 
regulation specific to GM technology. 
• making decisions solely on a scientific basis or, alternatively, on more than science;  
• precaution having a lax or strict interpretation; and 
• eventually abandoning mandatory GM labelling. 
On mandatory labelling, some participants regarded such rules as a ‘quality’ indicator 
essential for the free market to function.  
6   Topic mapping exercise 
The topic mapping exercise was structured around the three topics that received the most 
votes at the end of the morning.  These were: multiple agricultures; regulations and 
legislation; and societal and consumer choice.  With hindsight, it is apparent that the first 
provided a specific and novel scenario, while the other two coincided closely with current 
policy language and aims.  The three main topics could be seen as related elements of the 
same future, rather than as three different futures.  
 
The discussion below of the three topics corresponds to diagrams devised by the 
participants during the afternoon session.  The diagrams depict chains of causes and 
consequences; they were produced by re-arranging the post-it notes from the morning 
session and by adding extra ones.  Main concepts were put in the middle, and some 
important ones were written in all-capital letters.  The diagrams used arrows to link causal 
chains.  Afterwards these diagrams were reproduced in electronic form, in a way which 
attempts to convey the original intentions, while adding dashed lines to indicate implied 
causal chains (see Section 7 for the diagrams). 
 
6.1   Multiple agricultures: ‘remodelling institutional 
arrangements’ 
 
This group began by discussing fundamental problems of how to link economic and 
environmental aspects of European agriculture.  According to some participants, the 
present agricultural system adds little value, so a competitive advantage remains difficult 
outside the EU or in Eastern Europe.  Farmers face pressures to adopt sustainable, 
environment-friendly methods, which incur greater costs and so need a means to recoup 
these, e.g. through niche markets.  Biotechnology has been widely opposed by critics as 
leading to a further industrialisation of agriculture, though R&D could result in new products 
seen as desirable, including novel types of of GM products.  So the establishment of 
measures to allow the co-existence of different production methods becomes essential to 
maintain differential markets which could reward quality products, through a long process 
that may need another decade.   
 
Taking up the idea of multiple agricultures, the group explored the problems and 
opportunities associated with making a commitment to various types of agriculture running 
side-by-side in Europe. Initially the discussion assumed three categories of agriculture – 
organic, conventional and GM.  It was agreed that all of these needed to be viable and that 
GM should not undermine the viability of the other two.   
 
However, further discussion recognised that these categories may not be fixed. New 
categories may emerge and the definition of existing ones might change; for example, 
there could be differentiation among types of organic products. A range of scientific, 
political and cultural influences might bring about such changes. These could strain the 
policy-making process if it was too inflexible and unable to accommodate the emergence of 
new categories.  So this discussion gave a central role to the idea of co-existence, which is 
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currently being elaborated in Europe. However, the participants wanted debate to go 
beyond the current model of three fixed agricultural categories. 
 
As a way forward for Europe, the discussion formulated three central policy elements:  
 
i. a commitment to multiple agricultures,  
ii. remodelling institutional arrangements, and  
iii. incorporating the Precautionary Principle as a normal part of good governance.  
 
These features would ensure the co-existence of crops and of regulatory regimes, on more 
than a voluntary basis, e.g. by preventing gene flow from GM to other crops.  Through 
labelling, it would also provide consumer choice (though the US case at the WTO could 
challenge this).  Beyond the policy arena, stakeholders could make choices about the 
Precautionary Principle for themselves, thus sharing responsibility with government.  By 
contrast to that ideal scenario, a nightmare future would be chaos across multiple 
agricultural types – e.g., GM contaminating other types, or co-mingling of organic with high-
value GM crops. 
 
According to one comment in this group, people have strong moral feelings which run 
beyond any risk (in the biophysical sense) of current technological developments.  So 
society must provide a clear forum to debate the value basis, alongside science. Otherwise 
NGOs will more easily organise protest. 
 
6.2   Regulation and legislation: ‘publicly trusted 
legislation’ 
 
This group explored the causes and consequences of ideal regulation. They decided that 
the main issue was trust and acceptability, as the basis for regulation to work.  So they 
decided to focus on the elements that would contribute to trusted regulation.  
 
First they identified reasons for the moratorium (as an example of regulation not working) 
in order to elaborate on ways to move towards workable and acceptable regulation, and to 
consider what role various stakeholders would play in that process.  Because GMOs were 
widely perceived as a symbol of globalisation in public debate, it was difficult to separate 
scientific risk issues from ideological or political ones; as a way forward, public discussion 
should include all such issues.  Often ‘what consumers (or the public) want’ was invoked in 
wider debate, but with little basis for knowing their views. 
 
An issue that had led to conflicting views in the morning discussion – ‘decisions not based 
on science but presented as being based on science’ – was identified as a cause of 
mistrust.  This led to further discussion on what factors could legitimately be considered in 
decision making.  According to one participant, for example, ‘science is science’ – i.e. the 
boundary is obvious.  There was disagreement about whether regulatory decisions are 
generally based on science, about how to distinguish between scientific/non-scientific 
issues, and about whether or how extra-scientific criteria should be included.  Some 
participants proposed that governments should make explicit how decisions are based on 
more than science, as a means to gain public trust.  But they disagreed about how value 
judgements should (or do) enter the regulatory procedure. 
 
This group also discussed the precautionary principle and its role in ideal regulation. 
Disagreements arose over what precautionary elements would look like.  Some argued 
that precaution would radically change risk assessment (not just risk management).  
Others maintained a traditional understanding of risk assessment, e.g. as straightforwardly 
based on science.  From that standpoint, precaution had relevance only to risk 
management, and its proper role was already settled by Commission policy documents. 
 
Apart from accounts of science and precaution, other important elements were liability for 
damage and development of ‘good GMOs’. 
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All the above elements were seen as possible causes of the central goal, ‘publicly trusted 
legislation’.  Its content would influence public trust and acceptance.  In those ways, trust 
was seen as both a basis and result of regulation.  Ideally, risk research, regulation and 
management would work as a continuous interactive triangle (not simply a linear 
sequence).  
 
Regarding the consequences, workable regulations ideally would lead to a proliferation of 
agri-bio R&D programmes.  The group also discussed whether this ideal regulation could 
serve as a global model.  The EU framework might be globally recognised as ‘a model for 
the responsible and safe promotion of new technologies’.  The global co-existence of 
different regulatory regimes could push the WTO to take a decision on the appropriate role 
for ‘other legitimate factors’ in regulatory decisions.   
 
6.3   Societal and consumer choice: ‘a trustworthy system’ 
 
This group discussion was the most difficult because it was located near the main door, 
where some extra participants arrived after the discussion had begun.  Consequently, 
some made statements with little reference to the previous discussion.  
 
The group made a distinction between consumer choice (implying a product) and societal 
choice (implying technological directions), and decided to consider the two topics 
separately. For a while they struggled with societal choice, but the topic seemed too 
general and open-ended. So eventually they concentrated on consumer choice.  As a 
prerequisite, this would require transparency by government and industry, e.g. through 
clear labelling.  Transparency was important because consumer preferences have reasons 
other than risks, e.g. dislike for a particular production method. 
 
The group decided that the central policy aim or future was informed choice (‘as informed 
as I want to be’), that is, giving the consumer enough information to allow informed choice. 
This central aim was re-interpreted as ‘a trustworthy system’, i.e. providing an informed 
choice.  
 
From that central goal, there were three possible chains of consequences: 
i. If the choice was left to consumers and a free market, then that arrangement might 
help preserve a diverse range of products.  
ii. Food producers might decide to reject GM products if they thought there would be 
no market for them, thus restricting choice.  
iii. Consumers might be content with being allowed informed choice and would 
become accustomed to GM products, thus eventually allowing abandonment of 
GM labelling. 
The discussion took up some of the difficulties in recognising and addressing public 
concerns.  People may not act in the real world on the basis of what they tell opinion-poll 
surveys, e.g. about what products they would buy.  Many people do not accept GM 
technology, so consumer choice becomes more important, but preferences may be more 
varied than simply non-GM, e.g. products of Integrated Crop Management (ICM).  Public 
choice means listening to concerns through consultations, not simply referendums.  Many 
people feel uneasy that technological developments are ‘messing with nature’, so ways are 
needed to address such concerns, which go beyond transparency about science and 
regulation. 
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7   Topic mapping diagrams 
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biodiversity 
food producers 
specialise 
stakeholders make 
choices about ‘P.P.’ 
for themselves 
lobbies allowed to 
‘dictate’ where GM 
crops are grown 
DEMOCRACY AND 
COMPROMISES 
MULTIPLE 
AGRICULTURES 
remodelling 
institutional 
arrangements 
P.P. is ‘normal’ in 
good governance, just 
as all other principles 
ideal 
GM varieties 
accepted for  
use by  
organic farmers 
GM is no issue 
any more, focus 
on safety or not? 
what next? 
organic, GM, 
conventional 
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7.2   Regulation and legislation 
 
     PUBLIC      INDUSTRY      SCIENTIFIC 
   (citizen/consumer) 
 
 PROBLEMS   
 
 
 SOLUTIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GMOs: 
symbol of globalization 
no trust in 
decisions 
not working 
regulation 
protection of the 
EU market 
decisions not based on 
science but presented as 
science-based 
discuss further issues 
associated to globalization public consultation clear liability 
develop ‘good’ GMOs 
suited for EU 
the making explicit of decisions 
(based on more than science) 
transparency of  
government and industry 
existence of and contact 
with GMOs 
‘reasonable’ 
politics 
take time 
clear and reviewable decisions on 
a case-by-case basis 
EU framework globally 
recognised as model for 
responsible and safe 
promotion of new 
technologies 
co-existence of 
different crops 
world-scale agreement 
on the way forward 
WTO accepts OLFs 
co-existence of different 
regulatory regimes 
ideal 
workable regulations lead to proliferation of agro-bio 
research and development programmes 
ideal 
GM food and feed widely accepted 
ideal 
consensus on how to use GMOs 
PUBLICLY 
TRUSTED 
LEGISLATION 
ideal 
continuous triangle of research-
regulation-management 
decision on OLFs leads to 
WTO case 
CONSEQUENCES 
7.3   Societal and consumer choice 
 
 reasons other 
than risks no consumer choice 
ideal 
consumer’s choice 
granted 
transparency 
transparency 
industry and 
government 
consumer choice 
e.g. labelling 
informed choice: 
‘as informed as I 
want to be’ 
TRUSTWORTHY 
SYSTEM 
ideal 
public confidence in 
review and decision 
making 
customer’s real choice 
between GM and non-
GM food 
ideal 
consumers’ choice left 
to free markets 
consumers content 
with choice 
food producers 
reject all GMOs 
farmers and 
producers might 
reject GM 
nightmare 
no real choice because no 
GM food available 
preserving diversity 
of products in 
danger 
consumers used to 
seeing GM on shelves
ideal 
GM labelling scrapped  
due to public 
indifference to GM 
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8   Overlapping themes 
The discussions on all three topics took up familiar themes, looking at various aspects 
of the near future.  Across the topic groups were some common themes – e.g., 
precaution, trust and differentiated agriculture. 
 
8.1   Precaution 
 
Albeit with no consensus on its meaning, precaution was often mentioned as a basis for 
better policies – e.g., for different ways to design risk research and agricultural systems, 
or as a basis for consumer choice to influence such systems, and even for consumers 
to share responsibility for them.  According to some participants, the Precautionary 
Principle was seen as a big concept for doing battle with the USA, especially around 
GM crops, but as too big for EU citizens to use.  In public debate, EU policy has been 
widely seen through the prism of the US-EU dispute, e.g. as submission or defiance 
towards the USA, rather than as European judgements about the meaning of 
precaution.  So there was a need to make precaution into a routine tool, useable for 
regulatory and consumer practice. 
 
Such comments intersect with the relatively broad accounts of precaution in the 
introductory talks and in some policy documents cited there (e.g. European Parliament, 
Economic and Social Council).  These contrast with narrow accounts that see 
precaution as a special case, which can be triggered only by specific conditions. 
 
8.2   Trust 
 
‘Trust’ emerged as an important theme in at least two of the three topic groups.  
Participants discussed public mistrust in the decision making system at present and the 
need to create a more trustworthy system for the future.  This would require further 
institutional changes, e.g. greater transparency of decision-making, and potentially 
open-ended demands for information on how products are made.  As an element of a 
trustworthy system, some advocated transparency about the extra-scientific criteria 
involved in regulatory decisions, though some disagreed that these were (or should be) 
involved. 
 
8.3   Differentiated agriculture 
 
All participants supported the current EU policy commitment to co-existence (of GM, 
conventional and organic agriculture), but some saw this as potentially conflicting with 
more complex categories of agriculture.  Examples of differentiated categories included 
the following: 
 
i. Multiple agricultures beyond the tripartite stereotypes 
ii. ‘Good GMOs’, e.g. medicinal crops 
iii. Integrated Crop Management, as an approach which could involve GM or 
conventional crops. 
In general, ‘multiple’ meant diverse types of crops or cultivation methods – by contrast 
to the policy concept of multifunctional agriculture, which emphasises alternatives to 
cultivating crops. 
9   Observations on the process 
For all three topics, discussions tended to centre on familiar themes, looking at aspects 
of the near future. The Multiple Agricultures topic stimulated the most creative 
discussion, partly because it established a specific and plausible future scenario.  The 
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other two topics were more difficult as a basis for constructing chains of causes and 
consequences.  This was partly because they started as topics, rather than policy 
scenarios, and the topics did not become much more specific during discussion.   
Why not?  One facilitator offers the following hypothesis for why these topics provided 
less stimulus for discussion: ‘It was too demanding for participants to imagine possible 
future developments, assess whether they would favour them, defend them against 
other group members, and arrive at consistent scenarios together with the other 
participants – a process which would require homogenising diverse views. Participants 
became puzzled: either they seemed to expect to build scenarios from likely 
developments, or else to ‘backcast’ developments from scenarios seen as either ideal 
or nightmarish. Thus it was no wonder that they stayed within single issues, which 
seemed easier to handle.’  If that explains the dynamics, then it would be all the more 
difficult for a facilitator to shift the group discussion from a topic to a specific scenario. 
 
In those two groups – on Regulation and Legislation, and on Consumer and Societal 
Choice – more difficult disagreements arose, perhaps due to the group composition 
rather than inherent features of the issues.  For the topic of Societal and Consumer 
Choice, some members attempted to discuss how the entire society could participate in 
decision-making, But this idea was criticised, e.g. by asking how ordinary people could 
legitimately challenge the judgements of elected officials during their term of office.  
Such objections were bypassed by abandoning societal choice as a focus for 
discussion and instead focusing on choices of individual consumers. 
 
The introductory talks and opening question emphasised precaution.  This theme arose 
to some extent in the post-it notes but was marginal in the diagrams of possible futures.  
This marginal role has several possible reasons. Precaution itself may be marginal to 
the mindset of most policy actors around GM crops. Precaution may be seen as 
implicitly involved in the issues under discussion, rather than as a special measure to 
be taken. And/or participants disagreed about the meaning of precaution and were 
reluctant to record disagreements.   
 
Indeed, when members of a group disagreed about a key point, resulting in a lively 
discussion (e.g. about the definition or relevance of precaution), they tended not to 
record the points made.  There was a tacit assumption that only agreed points should 
be recorded, or perhaps a tendency to avoid contentious points.  Some participants 
were reluctant to express critical views or lacked the confidence to do so.  
Consequently, the post-it notes and diagrams omitted important views held by 
participants, even though the organisers had encouraged everyone to express and 
incorporate any disagreements.  As a example of such silencing, one participant who 
expressed anti-GM views was isolated by a strong group view to the contrary and so 
left the group. 
 
As another kind of silence, there were few new ideas from Commission officials, though 
the participants did not include the officials most centrally involved in the sector of GM 
crops.  This sector is seen as a political ‘hot potato’, which may discourage new people 
from becoming involved.  At the workshop, ideas came mainly from national regulators 
and companies. 
 
After each group completed the diagrams of possible futures, participants were invited 
to discuss implications for their own roles, but few responded.  Possible reasons include 
the following: because little time remained, because the diagrams were not sufficiently 
specific about potential futures, and/or because people were reluctant to talk publicly 
about the implications for their own role. 
 
After the small-group discussions, the carousel procedure gave participants a welcome 
change and a means to hear about the other discussions and to generate extra ideas.  
This created a new group dynamic, thus reviving discussion. 
 
In retrospect, what resulted from the open-ended method of the workshop?  The initial 
question for discussion, with its idea/nightmare contrast, was intended to generate 
elements of possible futures which may be seen as desirable by some participants but 
not by others (and vice versa).  This method aimed to highlight any normative 
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differences, e.g. views of desirable futures, and thus to generate a broader range of 
plausible scenarios.  Implicitly, this method assumed that descriptions of the future are 
separable from value judgements about their desirability.   
 
In the workshop process, however, such differences in values and norms rarely arose – 
partly because of the group composition, and perhaps because diverse views were 
homogenised by the group effort to devise scenarios.  Minority views were often 
marginalised rather than incorporated into more imaginative scenarios.  Consequently, 
although the diagrams are ostensibly neutral descriptions of plausible futures, they tend 
to express the dominant values of the participants.  (Indeed, a similar process 
happened in some national workshops – e.g. France, Germany and the UK – first in the 
imbalance of the group composition, and secondly in the discussions.) 
 
The experience gained can be used for learning to improve future exercises of this type.  
For example, organisers could take the following measures.   
 
In planning such a workshop: 
• discuss with prospective participants what they might hope to gain from the 
experience, in terms of their roles and needs vis à vis the topic at hand (for 
example, in Austria government officials were keen to meet to discuss policy 
change options, and in Germany NGOs were keen to discuss the practical 
implications of precaution) 
• devise a thematic focus which can attract specific constituencies, even if not 
representing the full range of relevant policy actors. 
In structuring the event: 
• encourage people to write down their thoughts on a topic individually, before 
working together as a group, so as to avoid group suppression of some viewpoints 
• use techniques that encourage participants not to dismiss unusual or extreme views 
but rather to view them as an aid to creative thinking 
• focus discussion on a specific scenario or ‘policy future’, not simply a topic  
• suggest how participants could record and incorporate disagreements into the 
diagrams  
• suggest a timescale further into the future, to facilitate creative thinking beyond 
currently obvious forces and issues 
• give facilitators more guidance on the above points, as well as agreeing with them 
in advance various prompts for the discussion. 
10   Using the results 
The PEG project has been using the workshop results to plan the rest of our work, in 
several ways.  Key points were presented and discussed at the partners’ two-day 
meeting held immediately after the workshop.  Many PEG partners had contributed to 
the workshop, e.g. by acting as facilitators or note-takers, and they subsequently 
contributed ideas for how to analyse the results. Discussion included the following 
points and questions for further research:  
 
• Science-based decisions 
Workshop participants disagreed about whether regulatory decisions could or should be 
based entirely on science, i.e. whether other factors could be legitimately included.  
This disagreement relates to our research on how ‘science’ is defined in practice.  How 
do regulatory procedures draw boundaries between scientific and extra-scientific 
criteria? Between expertise and mere opinion?  How does precaution help to open up 
that question? 
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• Risk assessment/management 
In the workshop discussion, ideal regulatory practices were described as a continuous 
triangle between risk research, regulation and management; this means that risk 
assessment and management have a mutual dependence.  Such a complex view has 
relevance to debates on appropriate regulatory procedures.  Several member states 
have adopted EU policy on ‘the functional separation of risk assessment and 
management’, i.e. so that different bodies are responsible for the two functions.  
Sometimes this is understood as excluding risk-management or normative judgements 
from expert advice, yet such an absolute separation has been criticised as unrealistic or 
illusory.  ‘Other legitimate factors’ (OLF) are often discussed as if they lay outside risk 
assessment, yet closer scrutiny can reveal extra-scientific judgements within risk 
assessment. (See Figure 1, resulting from subsequent discussions among the PEG 
partners.)  What are the mutual interactions between risk research, assessment and 
management? 
 
Figure 1. Perceived links between risk research, assessment and management, and 
between these and ‘other legitimate factors’ (OLFs) 
 
• Co-existence 
In the workshop discussion, adventitious presence of transgenes was identified as an 
important problem which links gene flow, the agro-food chain and thus consumer 
choice.  Research on gene flow acquires an extra significance for management 
measures needed to achieve co-existence.  For modelling gene flow and devising such 
measures in an agricultural context, what expertise is being developed? 
 
• Precaution 
Precaution arose at many points in the workshop discussion but generated 
disagreements and so remained marginal to the cause-consequence diagrams.  For 
example, participants disagreed about whether precaution makes a difference to 
regulatory science.  At the same time, precaution was mentioned as a general 
perspective on innovation choices as well as regulation, and as a basis for individual as 
well as societal responsibility.   
 
These aspects of the workshop confirmed our sense that precaution may have 
important but implicit roles in European developments on GM crops.  In that context the 
European Commission does not mention precaution, yet it is widely invoked to oppose 
GM crops, as well as to defend a different approach here than in the USA.  How do 
understandings of precaution shape regulation and mediate conflicts?  Conversely, how 
do regulatory conflicts shape different understandings of precaution? 
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12   Project documents 
Related documents from this project are downloadable at the website of the 
Biotechnology Policy Group, Open University, http://www-
tec.open.ac.uk/cts/peg/index.htm 
 
Eventually the website will include reports of the EU-level and national studies from this 
research project. 
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Appendix I. Attendance list 
 
 Name  Organisation 
 
Participants   
Jan Staman   Rathenau Institute, Netherlands 
Martine Delanoy  Health Ministry, Belgium 
Mark Cantley   European Commission, D-G Research 
Ioannis Economidis  European Commission, D-G Research 
Jim Dratwa   Harvard University 
Guy Deregnaucourt  Environment Committee, European Parliament 
Andrew Barnard  European Commission, D-G Enterprise 
Patrick Rudelsheim  PERSEUS bvba, Belgium  
Halima Khan   Cabinet Office, UK 
Sebastien Goux  Health Ministry, Belgium 
Jonina Stefansdottir  Environmental & Food Agency of Iceland 
Jean-Francois Sarrazin  Bayer CropScience, Belguim 
Eva Claudia Lang  Ministry for Health & Women, Austria 
Hilde Willekens   Syngenta International AG, Belgium 
 
PEG partners   
Jesper Toft   Roskilde University, Denmark 
Joyce Tait   Edinburgh University 
Helge Torgersen  Institute of Technology Assessment, Austrian Academy 
    of Sciences 
David Tabara   Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona (UAB), Spain 
Christophe Bonneuil  INRA STEPE, France 
David Wield   The Open University 
Sue Oreszczyn   The Open University 
Susan Carr   The Open University 
Stephanie Ronda  INRA STEPE, France 
Karin Boschert   Institute of Sociology, University of Munich 
Piet Schenkelaars  Schenkelaars Biotechnology Consultancy, Netherlands 
Joseph Murphy   The Open University 
Les Levidow   The Open University 
Marlene Gordon  The Open University 
 
Facilitators   
Mark Yoxon   INFORM 
Mo Shapiro   INFORM 
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Appendix II. Agenda 
 
Time  Item & Brief Description 
09.30  Coffee 
10.00  Introduction 
10.15  European GM crop issues 
Les Levidow - Research Fellow - The Open University 
 
10.25  Current changes in the EU regulatory system on GM crops 
Patrick Rudelsheim - General Partner - PERSEUS bvba,  
formerly Bayer CropScience 
 
10.35  Overview on how the day is to be run.  
 
10.50  Using the question, ‘For GM Crops and the implementation of the 
Precautionary Principle in the European Union, what are the key 
elements of your ideal and nightmare futures?’  
 
Participants generate their ideal and nightmare futures.  
 
A facilitated group activity. 
 
  Consolidating and Prioritising 
Participants prioritise which futures they think most need further 
discussion in the afternoon. 
 
13.00  Lunch 
14.00  Brief presentation by a member of the project team on futures 
exercises. 
 
14.10  Facilitated groups draft a cause and consequence map for the policy 
futures requiring further discussion. 
 
Participants select the futures they wish to explore.  
 
15.00  Implications – Participants are asked to consider the implications of 
the outcomes for their own particular role. 
 
15.50  Presentations: short presentations from each group, using a 
carousel method.  
 
16.40  Summing up  
Jan Staman - Director of the Rathenau Institute, Netherlands 
16.50  Close  
17.00  Drinks Reception  
 
Two professional facilitators will run the workshop in conjunction with members of the 
project team. 
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Appendix III. Three talks 
1. Les Levidow: European GM crop issues (introductory talk) 
 Research Fellow, The Open University 
 
Today’s exercise is not about predicting the future or gaining consensus.   
Rather, it aims to hear all views about plausible futures which may be desirable or 
undesirable, from the standpoint of the various participants.  In that spirit, the briefing 
document surveyed current issues on how GM crops may be regulated and the 
relevance of precaution.  Institutional views were drawn from documents and 
interviews.  My talk will touch on such issues through simple pictures (see Figure 2). 
 
Trans-Atlantic conflict 
Since the late 1990s US maize shipments have been blocked because they may 
contain GM varieties not approved in the EU.  The USA and EU have disagreed about 
who has the burden to demonstrate that such non-approved varieties are present or 
absent.  The delay in decision-making on their approval comes from the overall de facto 
moratorium which was formalised by the EU Environment Council in June 1999.  As a 
precondition for resuming the regulatory procedure, member states demanded a more 
transparent procedure for risk assessment, as well as rules for traceability and labelling.  
In their view, a precautionary approach provides guidance for such regulatory changes 
and procedures. What is meant by precaution? 
 
Precaution as dialogue  
According to the Economic and Social Council, often decisions must be taken on the 
basis of uncertain and extremely complex data rather than scientific certainties – i.e. on 
a precautionary basis.  Consequently, risk assessment must be fostered as part of the 
negotiation mechanism on social issues.  Its actual role in society is to provide the 
bases for dialogue.  According to the European Parliament, precaution means that risk 
assessment should emphasise and investigate unknowns.  The Precautionary Principle 
(PP) can be triggered by initial suspicions or empirical assessments, not only after 
comprehensive studies have been done.  Precaution can generate alternative solutions: 
objectors should demonstrate that the alternatives are less harmful than the product to 
be replaced. 
 
Precaution as rules 
According to the Commission, the PP is a special case triggered by scientific grounds 
for uncertainty about risk which may exceed the chosen level of protection.  The PP 
applies mainly to risk management of such uncertainty, e.g. by seeking additional 
scientific information for a more complete risk assessment.  Precautionary measures 
must satisfy criteria of proportionality, non-discrimination, consistency and a cost-
benefit analysis of technological options.  In the Commission’s view, moreover, the PP 
has been unwarranted for GM crops so far – except in one case (a GM potato), where 
the available information was inadequate for a risk assessment.  For products awaiting 
a decision, expert advice has found no evidence of any potentially negative effects on 
the environment or human health, so those cases cannot justify recourse to the PP, 
argue Commission officials. 
 
Precaution as evidence of safety 
Likewise industry has regarded regulatory delay in approvals as not justified 
scientifically or legally. Indeed, delay severely jeopardises confidence in the EU 
regulatory system, they argue.  According to some risk assessments, the safety 
conclusion is based on scientific evidence rather than on assumptions, and thus is 
precautionary. 
 
Proposals for commercial authorisation 
GM crop applications have been accumulating since the late 1990s.  Many companies 
have added information to accommodate the requirements of the revised Deliberate 
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Release Directive (DRD).  Scientific advisory committees have set out more stringent 
requirements for evidence of safety: how will these be satisified? 
 
Uncertainties about risk 
Various risks have been addressed by research projects funded by the Commission or 
by member states, but arguments continue on key issues, even among regulatory 
officials.  For antibiotic-resistance markers, which ones should be phased out? How 
soon?  If Bt crops generate resistance in insects, would this count as an adverse effect 
under the DRD?  Likewise for the spread of herbicide-tolerant weeds through 
volunteers or pollen flow?  What measures are necessary to prevent these effects?  For 
evaluating potential harm from GM crops, and from broad-spectrum herbicides, what 
should be the comparator?  What form of conventional agriculture? or relatively less 
intensive methods? 
 
Heading towards what future? 
The choice of comparator relates to more basic issues of intensive agricultural models.  
Towards what future is European agriculture being led by GM crops?  Will this mean 
greater or less sustainability?  What is meant by sustainability? 
 
Herbicide effects 
Such abstract questions become more concrete in the case of herbicide-tolerant crops 
and their herbicide implications.  Controversy includes the following questions:  Will 
such crops encourage or reduce dependence on herbicide usage? Will broad-spectrum 
herbicides replace the ones previously used?  If so, will they lead to greater or less 
biodiversity in agricultural environments?  That last question is being tested in large-
scale trials in the UK: look for the dead ladybirds (Figure 2, lower left-hand corner)!  In 
Denmark, environmental policy is to use groundwater as drinking water without any 
treatment.  Yet glyphosate has been found 1m below the ground, so this has generated 
debate on what restrictions to place on its use.  Will it be approved for spraying on 
glyphosate-tolerant crops? 
 
Monitoring 
The DRD has means to accommodate uncertain risks within commercialisation.  A 
monitoring plan must be designed to confirm any assumptions in the risk assessment - 
unless the risk is shown to be negligible.  Companies have responded to this request in 
various ways.  Most claim that the risk would be negligible, though with somewhat 
different reasoning in each case.  Some propose to carry out monitoring measures 
under the Directive, while others do not.  How will member states respond to these 
proposals? 
 
Co-existence and gene flow 
Beyond the risk of adverse effects under the DRD, there are extra reasons to manage 
the prospect of transgenes flowing to other crops, since these could jeopardise the 
economic value of non-GM crops, especially organic ones. 
 
Arguments continue over the mutual responsibility of farmers to avoid the adventitious 
presence of transgenes, the legal basis for enforcing any rules, and the scientific basis 
for feasible rules.  How can co-existence be achieved? 
  
Labelling rules 
On what criteria should a ‘GM’ label be required? Draft regulations would require such a 
label on all products derived from GM grain.  These process-based regulations have 
gained wide support, as means 
• for tracing any harm back to its source in a GM crop (i.e. for precautionary aims); 
and 
• for ensuring that consumers have an informed choice. 
 
In response, industry has argued that only detectable GM material warrants a label 
It has opposed the draft regulations, on several grounds 
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• because such a rule could not be consistently enforced and could lead to fraud; and 
• because a ‘GM’ label will be perceived by consumers as a skull and  crossbones. 
  
How will the regulations be finalised, and how will they be implemented? 
 
WTO dispute 
In recent years, US threats of a WTO case have backfired politically, further 
antagonising the public against the USA and GM crops.  
  
Such reactions have made it more difficult for the Commission to obtain legislative 
changes which would facilitate the grain trade.  Its proposals have been criticised as 
concessions to the USA.  Now that the US government has initiated a WTO dispute 
over GM crops, how may this lead the EU to acccommodate or defy the USA? How will 
the dispute be cited as an argument in EU politics?  What difference could it make to 
developments here? 
 
Figure 2. ‘Rich picture’ representing key EU issues for GM crops (by Sue Oreszczyn)  
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2   Patrick Rudelsheim: Current changes in the EU regulatory system on GM 
 crops (introductory talk) 
 
General Partner of PERSEUS bvba; previously Global Head, BioScience Regulatory 
Affairs, Bayer Crop Science 
 
The second decade (2000-2010) of GM crops in Europe is characterized by completion 
of the regulatory framework and scientific documentation of uncertainties and risk 
factors. Irrespective of the wealth of information and efforts, there seems to be no link 
between knowledge, regulation and decision-making. Current regulatory changes have 
no clear relation to the risk research which has been done. Uncertainty is perceived as 
more important than familiarity and the proven safety track-record of GM crops. Other 
elements are as influential, e.g. wider visions for European agriculture or EU-US trade 
conflicts. Consequently, legislative proposals and decisions are often questioned as 
responses to pressure rather than inspired by safety concerns.    
 
Taking the precautionary principle as the cornerstone for the regulatory approach, its 
implementation should be weighed with care. It leads to a prior risk assessment and 
subsequent risk management, as implemented in the different EU regulations. In a 
more general interpretation it can lead to further research – public and private – in 
areas of uncertainty. Accepting that future new areas of concern may be identified, it is 
the basis of more general and long-term monitoring. Yet precaution also forces an 
evaluation of alternatives, including the scenario of not deploying the new opportunities, 
and this inevitably requires clarity on the baseline for comparison. Finally, as illustrated 
by this study, different actors may have divergent views on the precautionary principle. 
While such a key principle deserves continuous refining, that process should not 
confuse or delay decision-making.   
 
The dilemma we face is to decide which of the two interpretations of the precautionary 
principle should prevail – namely, that the lack of risk confirmation should not preclude 
restrictive measures, or that the lack of safety confirmation should not hinder product 
use. As a way forward, regulatory developments have several precautionary objectives 
– e.g., addressing uncertainty, providing transparency of decision-making and 
predictable rules for R&D activity, non-discrimination against a specific technology, and 
measures proportionate to potential impact.  
 
3   Jan Staman: summing up 
 Director, Rathenau Institute 
 
Initially I didn’t believe in today’s procedure, but we did a marvellous job.  The carousel 
method was a nice way to focus the discussion at the end.  Different discussions 
focused on similar issues.  If there is public trust, then there is space for GM food.  No 
one in our group objected to GM crops, e.g. as unethical. 
 
Right now we have the Precautionary Principle as a big gun (or B-52) to bomb the USA, 
but we don’t use it for our own practices, at a time when we need a more trustworthy 
system.  We should get the Precautionary Principle as a normal principle of politics, 
internalised in the minds of the producers and consumers.  This is what I learned from 
today. 
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Appendix IV: Briefing document 
 
EU Regulation of GM Crops:  
What Role for Precaution?  
 
Les Levidow 
Centre for Technology Strategy, The Open University, Milton Keynes MK7 6AA, UK 
tel. +44-1908-654782, fax +44-1908-654825, email L.Levidow@open.ac.uk 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
Amid continuing controversy over the commercialisation of genetically-modified (GM) 
crops, the European Commission is seeking ways to resolve outstanding regulatory 
issues and move beyond the de facto moratorium. Pressure to find policy solutions has 
intensified as a result of the growing number of GM products awaiting marketing 
approval, and the initiation of a US-led complaint to the World Trade Organisation about 
the restrictions placed on GM trade by the EU. 
 
The Precautionary Principle (PP), which underpins the EU’s approach to GM crops, can 
be seen as providing opportunities to find ways through the regulatory impasse, but 
those opportunities will depend on how the PP is interpreted and implemented. This 
briefing document, which is based on research for an EU-funded project called 
‘Precautionary Expertise for GM Crops (PEG)’, provides examples of views and 
practices relating to precaution gathered from EU-level bodies, member states and 
companies. 
 
Official definitions of the PP broadly state that uncertain risks can justify temporary 
measures to avoid potentially serious or irreversible harm. The European Commission 
has tried to establish an EU-wide common understanding of the PP by means of an 
official communication, but other understandings exist, even among EU institutions. 
Organisations may refer to ‘precaution’ or ‘the precautionary approach’, sometimes 
interchangeably with the PP. The language of precaution may be used strategically, for 
example to promote a particular stance on products or to mediate conflicts.  
 
Precaution may be viewed, for example, as: 
• Justified only for exceptional cases, triggered by specific scientific uncertainties 
• Allowing time to gain more or better scientific answers 
• Enabling a process of social negotiation 
• Ensuring that alternative technological solutions are considered. 
The European Commission believes that use of the PP should be strictly limited. It 
argues that the PP’s use is generally unwarranted for GM crops so far, because its 
Scientific Committee on Plants has found no evidence of risk for the GM products 
currently awaiting a marketing decision. Similarly, the biotechnology industry argues 
that regulatory delays cannot be justified scientifically.  
Other bodies argue that precautionary measures are justified. For example, in 1999 the 
EU Environment Council stated that decisions should be suspended until there is a 
more transparent risk assessment procedure and until rules on traceability and labelling 
are established; precaution would provide guidance for such regulatory changes.  
Consumer organisations make similar demands. Farmer organisations want measures 
to avoid GM contamination of conventional seed, to assign responsibility for co-
existence, and to avoid liability for adverse impacts. Environmental organisations want 
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more funding for risk research but believe that GM field trials pose unacceptable risks. 
They want government funding for research into alternatives to GM crops. 
 
In EU member states, various practices are linked to precaution. For example, the 
Netherlands government holds that scientific risk assessment is itself precautionary. Its 
expert advisors frequently ask companies to provide better evidence regarding health 
risks of GM food and feed. In Germany the competent authority (CA) has initiated a 
public debate about GM crops and, with the Belgian CA, is advising Bayer on its plans 
for market-stage monitoring. The German government has established a new biosafety 
research programme. In the UK, the CA has funded farm-scale trials to compare the 
impact of GM and conventional crops on farmland biodiversity, in consultation with 
environmental groups. In Denmark, the CA requests information on how herbicide-
tolerant crops may affect overall herbicide use. A debate has begun there about 
glyphosate residues in groundwater, which may have implications for glyphosate-
tolerant GM crops.  Thus member states generally understand precaution to mean 
identifying and clarifying uncertainties, sometimes in discussion with stakeholder 
groups. 
 
Companies are responding in various ways to the extra requirements of the revised 
Deliberate Release Directive, for example the requirement for case-specific monitoring 
of commercial use for possible adverse effects. Monsanto, for its glyphosate-tolerant 
oilseed rape and beet and Bt cotton, argues that no specific risks have been identified 
or that risks are effectively zero, so no monitoring is necessary. Pioneer, for its Bt 
maize, concludes there would be ‘no significant risks’ for non-target organisms so does 
not propose to monitor those organisms. However, Pioneer acknowledges ‘a limited 
potential’ for the target pest to develop Bt resistance and so has drawn up monitoring 
and risk management plans to safeguard the product. Bayer, for its glufosinate-tolerant 
oilseed rape, has proposed plans for monitoring the occurrence, impact and 
management of glufosinate-tolerant volunteer plants and weeds, even though it 
believes the crop poses negligible risks.   
 
Other issues relating to commercialisation that still have to be resolved include how to 
define 'adverse effects' in risk assessment  (what baseline to use), how to phase out 
antibiotic-resistant marker genes, how to devise workable rules for traceability and 
labelling, and what measures are needed to allow the co-existence of GM and 
conventional crops.  
 
Now that the US government has initiated a case against the EU under WTO rules, 
understandings of precaution may become more important. US pressure on the EU 
could lead to commercial authorisation of more GM products, or could instead 
strengthen demands for greater precaution and thus result in further delays.  
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EU Regulation of GM Crops:  
What Role for Precaution? 
1   Introduction  
European conflicts over GM crops have generated many difficult policy issues, for 
example: 
 
• How should the EU deal with the controversy and go beyond the de facto 
moratorium? 
• What is the relevance of precaution? 
• How could various accounts of precaution help to deal with the conflicts in practice? 
 
Such questions become more compelling as European authorities try to deal with 
several product files awaiting decisions, amid pressures for extra conditions and a US-
led challenge to the EU at the WTO.   
 
This document surveys EU-wide views on precaution in general, its relevance to 
uncertain risks of GM crops, and practical issues around regulatory procedures.  It 
draws on a current research project, ‘Precautionary Expertise for GM Crops’, which is 
analysing how current European practices compare with various accounts of the 
precautionary principle.  It looks at new institutional arrangements which may help to 
accommodate conflicting views and wider public concerns.  The document mainly 
draws on the EU-level part of the study, with some material from national studies. It 
sketches views based on documents and interviews.   
2   Precaution in general 
In official accounts of the Precautionary Principle (PP), uncertain risks can justify 
temporary measures to avoid potential harm.  For example: 
 
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific 
certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to 
prevent environmental degradation  
(Principle 15 from Rio UNCED conference, 1992). 
... precaution is normally applied by risk managers in case of established scientific 
uncertainty that risk assessors cannot reduce, eliminate or quantify (European 
Commission, reply to US FDA, 2000). 
For implementing the Precautionary Principle (PP), an EU-wide common understanding 
has been sought by the European Commission, especially through its 2000 
Communication on the PP.  However, ‘uncommon’ understandings are readily 
apparent, even among EU institutions.  Many organisations speak of ‘precaution’ or ‘the 
precautionary approach’, often interchangeably with the PP.  This is a source of 
potential confusion, since often the same term is used in different ways, while different 
terms are used in similar ways. 
 
All these ‘precautionary’ terms play various roles in informing regulatory procedures, 
expertise and social participation and may offer opportunities to deal with conflicts.  A 
survey of ‘precautionary’ understandings can help to identify practical roles for 
precaution which lie beyond the formal scope of the Commission Communication.  
Examples of the views of EU-level organisations are paraphrased below. 
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European Commission  
PP is a special case triggered by scientific grounds for uncertainty about any risk which 
may exceed the chosen level of protection.  The PP applies mainly to risk management 
of such uncertainty, e.g. by seeking or requiring additional scientific information for a 
more complete risk assessment.  Precautionary measures must satisfy criteria of 
proportionality, non-discrimination, consistency and a cost-benefit analysis of 
technological options.  Triggered in such a way, the PP is distinct from the ‘caution’ 
normally applied in risk assessment.   
 
Parliament  
The PP can be triggered by initial suspicions or empirical assessments, not only after 
comprehensive studies have been done.  Risk assessment should emphasise 
unknowns, e.g. the margin of uncertainty and the degree of ignorance.  Trade 
agreements cannot be invoked to restrict precaution: the SPS Agreement places the 
burden of evidence on WTO Members, and not only on the Member which blocks a 
product.  Precaution can generate alternative solutions: objectors should demonstrate 
that the alternatives are less harmful than the product to be replaced. 
 
Economic and Social Committee 
As well as gaining new knowledge for risk assessment, precaution means staging a 
wide-ranging social debate on what is desirable and what is feasible.  Risk assessment 
must be fostered as part of the negotiation mechanism on social issues.  Its actual role 
in society is to provide the bases for dialogue.  The advancement of democracy 
requires new decision-making processes.  Decisions will have to be taken on the basis 
of uncertain and extremely complex data rather than scientific certainties. 
 
Scientific Steering Committee 
Quality of life encompasses a state of complete physical, social and mental well-being.  
Beyond traditional risk assessment and management, quality of life criteria have 
already been included in the process in a non-systematic way via the precautionary 
principle and by considering public concerns, for example in issues such as BSE, 
GMOs and pesticides.   
 
NGOs  
Precaution should emphasise unknowns in risk assessment and enhance participation.  
Asking the right questions needs the involvement of stakeholders.  Uncertainty may be 
not only preliminary but systemic, e.g. because of ignorance or indeterminacy: there are 
areas where more time and research may never allow for adequate certainty.  
Decisions on the acceptability of technologies and activities, as well as on the intensity 
of their control, requires a mechanism to identify the preferences of society. 
 
Overview 
These views indicate that there are diverse accounts of precaution, for example: 
 
• as an exceptional case triggered by special circumstances, or as a general 
approach to risk assessment; 
• as a consequence of inadequate information, or as a means to test its 
• adequacy, e.g. by ensuring that all relevant questions have been asked;  
• as a more rigorous approach by government officials, and/or as a social negotiation 
process; 
• as a means to consider alternative technological solutions -- e.g., through cost-
benefit analysis and/or through social preferences. 
Each of those accounts can be used strategically, for example to justify a particular 
stance on products, or to mediate among conflicting views.  
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3   Precaution for GM crops: EU-level views 
These views about precaution in general may limit or open up opportunities for dealing 
with conflicts over GM crops.  A central question is how (or whether) the EU should 
move beyond the recent indecision on further commercial authorisations.  Some views 
of EU-level organisations are paraphrased here, mentioning ‘precaution’ only when it 
was explicit: 
 
EU Council 
Decisions should be delayed until extra conditions are satisfied. In June 1999 most 
member states signed one of two statements with these common features: for new 
authorisations of GM crops, decisions should be suspended until the EU establishes a 
more transparent procedure for risk assessment, as well as rules for traceability and 
labelling.  The PP (or precautionary approach) provides guidance for such regulatory 
changes and procedures.  Some member states also demand clearer rules on liability. 
 
Scientific Committee on Plants 
There is no evidence of risk to human health or the environment from products awaiting 
a decision on commercial authorisation.  For Bt maize, any non-target harm would be 
less than from agrochemical methods; and measures already proposed for Insect-
Resistance Management (IRM) would be adequate to delay resistance.  For herbicide-
tolerant oilseed rape, the prospect of herbicide-tolerant weeds would arise more from 
volunteers than from out crossing; a stewardship programme is needed to manage this 
(agronomic) problem. 
 
European Commission 
The PP has been unwarranted for GM crops so far.  Risk assessment should follow a 
case-by-case basis.  The EU has never applied the PP to GM crops, except in the 
Avebe potato case, where the available information was inadequate for a risk 
assessment.  For products awaiting a decision, expert advice has found no evidence of 
any potentially negative effects on the environment or human health, so those cases 
cannot justify recourse to the PP.  
 Its use must be strictly limited by evidence of risk or uncertainty, otherwise the PP may 
more readily come under challenge in international fora. 
 
Biotech industry 
Regulatory delay in approvals is not justified scientifically or legally, and severely 
jeopardises confidence in the EU regulatory system.  Industry’s risk assessment is 
based on scientific evidence rather than on assumptions. 
 
Consumer NGOs 
Commercialisation requires extra measures. Consumer NGOs do not challenge the 
safety of GM foods already approved, but point out that scientific risk assessment 
depends on the questions that scientists are to answer.  So consumer NGOs want 
public transparency regarding the questions which are asked (or not asked) by scientific 
experts.  Traceability and labelling are essential for consumer choice, e.g. to make their 
own judgements. 
 
Environmental NGOs 
Field releases should be stopped. Proof of safety is needed before commercialisation.  
Precaution requires more resources for risk research but field trials impose uncertain 
and unacceptable risks.  Regulatory reform should start by analysing the agro-
environmental problem, e.g., sustainability.  Government should fund alternatives to 
both agrochemicals and GM crops.  For all these reasons, environmental NGOs argue 
that the EU has not applied the PP to GM crops. 
 
Farmers’ organisations 
The EU needs measures to ensure that adventitious presence of GM material does not 
undermine non-GM crops, since this would be an adverse effect.  Also, COPA-
COGECA wants rule for assigning responsibility for co-existence and for avoiding 
liability for farmers. CPE believes that because of important knowledge gaps, there is 
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no safe basis to release GMOs, so destroying field trials is a way to implement the 
precautionary principle. 
4   National practices as precaution  
Within EU member states, precaution is regarded as a general approach or process, 
not simply as a special case to be triggered.  National debates and policy documents 
refer much to precaution but little to the Commission Communication.  In a general 
sense, precaution means identifying and clarifying uncertainties about potential harm, in 
ways which sometimes involve discussion with stakeholder groups.  When invited to 
participate in risk-assessment discussions, however, NGOs generally emphasise the 
need to develop alternative agricultural methods which they regard as more benign or 
sustainable.   
 
Below are some brief examples of initiatives by national Competent Authorities (CAs) 
for the Deliberate Release Directive.  Each example provides an explicit practical 
account of precaution, specific to national issues. 
 
Netherlands 
According to the Netherlands government, its risk assessment of GM products is based 
on scientific evidence rather than on assumptions, and thus is precautionary. In 
responses to files to market GM grain, Dutch experts on novel food and feed 
highlighted weaknesses in the available evidence about health risks.   
They criticized inadequate data on the compositional equivalence of the GM crop to a 
non-GM crop, as well as from animal feeding studies on toxicological effects.  They 
requested and obtained better evidence from companies.  NGOs have welcomed the 
transparent and stringent approach to evaluation to novel foods but their main concerns 
are about how agricultural options relate to sustainability.  In response to the 
environmental risk assessment of GM crops, NGOs have criticised the advisory 
committee (COGEM) for accepting poor-quality data and a comparative baseline of 
conventional agriculture, demanding instead a comparison to sustainable agriculture. 
 
Germany 
In the late 1990s the German government proposed a three-year large-scale cultivation 
and monitoring programme of GM crops, as part of a voluntary delay in 
commercialisation.  This programme was to include research on gene flow from 
herbicide-tolerant oilseed rape, as a precautionary measure to gain knowledge for 
improving the risk assessment.  However, the overall plan was changed when 
responsibility for GM crop regulation was shifted to the new Consumer Protection, 
Agriculture and Food Ministry, headed by a Green Party representative.  The new 
Ministry initiated a Diskurs grüne Gentechnik, a debate on GM crops and the 
appropriate agro-environmental criteria for their commercialisation.  The monitoring 
programme proposed previously was abandoned, though a new biosafety research 
programme was launched as part of the SDP-Green coalition agreement.  Industry 
designed their own cultivation and monitoring programme for testing maize in 
agricultural practice. Among Ministries, arguments continue over whether adequate 
knowledge is available to justify commercial authorisation and what uncertainties need 
to be clarified beforehand.  Meanwhile the German CA has cooperated with the Belgian 
CA for advising Bayer Crop Science on plans for market-stage monitoring of its 
herbicide-tolerant oilseed rape, as part of Bayer’s request for commercial authorisation. 
 
UK 
In the UK nearly two-thirds of land is in agricultural use and is seen as a central part of 
the environment.  In the late 1990s controversy arose over how GM herbicide-tolerant 
crops crops would affect herbicide usage and thus farmland biodiversity.  Advisory 
bodies warned that broad-spectrum herbicides could ‘sterilise’ the countryside, turning 
agricultural fields into ‘green concrete’.  As a precautionary measure, the UK’s CA 
(DEFRA) has funded farm-scale trials which aim to clarify effects on biodiversity.  These 
trials compare such effects in GM crop fields and in adjacent non-GM crops. They were 
designed in consultation with stakeholder groups, which asked that the non-GM 
comparator should include fields which undergo relatively little spraying.  The trials 
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themselves have generated further controversy, for example on possible 
‘contamination’ of conventional crops, and on methodological issues which could limit 
the utility of the results.  For example, the results would have statistical significance only 
for large differences in farmland biodiversity; yet some people may regard small 
differences as ecologically significant.   
 
Denmark 
Since the mid-1990s Denmark’s CA (then the EPA) has requested an evaluation of how 
GM herbicide-tolerant crops may affect overall herbicide usage in the long term.  As an 
impetus for this request, Danish environmental policy has sought to achieve substantial 
reductions in herbicide usage, partly because agriculture is regarded as part of the 
environment, and partly so that groundwater can be used directly as drinking water.  
Recently glyphosate was found in groundwater, so debate continues over the 
appropriate restrictions on its use, and this may bear upon an eventual decision about 
whether to permit glyphosate sprays on Roundup-Ready fodderbeet.  Another 
uncertainty is how such herbicides may affect farmland biodiversity.  To minimise any 
harm, voluntary guidelines ask farmers to limit and delay spraying; experiments have 
found that such practices can enhance weed flora and arthropod fauna, e.g. in the case 
of glyphosate-tolerant fodder beet.  Concerns remain about whether farmers will follow 
such guidelines, and whether regular annual spraying will kill weeds before they can 
produce seeds.   
5   Marketing applications 
Under the revised Deliberate Release Directive, 19 products are awaiting decisions on 
commercial authorisation.  Most are for grain import only, for several reasons.  One is 
that with this modest request, political difficulties around the environmental risk 
assessment can be avoided. Another reason is that successful authorisation could 
overcome legal difficulties around imported grain containing traces of GM varieties not 
yet approved by the EU.  This in turn would facilitate North American exports of grain, 
e.g. for use as animal feed, and thus GM seed sales to US farmers.   
 
The revised Directive offers means to accommodate environmental uncertainties within 
commercial use of a GM crop.  It requires case-specific monitoring to verify any 
assumptions in the risk assessment regarding prospects for a product to cause 
‘adverse effects’.  According to subsequent guidelines: ‘Where conclusions of the risk 
assessment identify an absence of risk or negligible risk, however, then case-specific 
monitoring may not be required.’  For relevant risks, the guidelines mention insect 
resistance and the spread of herbicide-tolerance.  The Directive also requires general 
surveillance for unanticipated risks. 
 
Applicants have given various responses to the requirement for case-specific 
monitoring.  In most cases, they claim that any risk is effectively zero or negligible, 
though this assessment may depend upon measures to manage uncertain risks.  In the 
latter cases, the risk assessment is linked with a monitoring plan, which requires extra 
kinds of expertise.  Below are some examples of company responses to monitoring 
requirements for marketing applications awaiting decisions under the revised directive. 
 
Monsanto 
Monsanto argues that their products warrant no monitoring under the Directive. A 
Monsanto product, oilseed rape tolerant to glyphosate (Roundup), is requested for grain 
import only.  According to the company, its risk assessment is based on scientific 
evidence rather than on assumptions, so there are no grounds to require case-specific 
monitoring.  This account of precaution is made explicit by the Netherlands CA in its 
assessment report.  Nevertheless the UK Competent Authority (and some NGOs) have 
criticised the risk assessment for inadequate information.   
 
Glyphosate-tolerant beet products have been submitted to Germany and Denmark for 
all uses including cultivation .  According to the risk assessment of the fodder beet by 
DLF-Trifolium and Monsanto, no specific risks have been identified.  The crop can 
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hybridise with weed beet, but glyphosate-tolerant hybrids would gain no selective 
advantage (in the absence of glyphosate) and thus would cause no environmental 
harm.  So risk-management methods would be no different than for conventional fodder 
beet.  Also, farmers’ switch from selective herbicides to glyphosate allows a delayed 
application, which could enhance biodiversity in agricultural fields.  The risk assessment 
assumes that glyphosate usage could not worsen biodiversity because conventional 
beet fields are currently kept weed-free.  For all these reasons, the company proposes 
no statutory monitoring. 
 
For Bt cotton, submitted to Spain, Monsanto’s risk assessment says that scientific data 
show that the risk of non-target harm is effectively zero.  Pests may gain resistance to 
Bt, but such an effect would be only an agronomic problem. On those grounds, no 
monitoring is proposed under the Directive, though the company plans to monitor fields 
for insect resistance on a voluntary basis.   
 
Pioneer 
Pioneer proposes to monitor for insect resistance. For a Bt maize product, submitted to 
Spain jointly by Pioneer and Mycogen, the risk assessment identifies two potential 
adverse effects.  From the results of various studies, it concludes that the product would 
cause ‘negligible’ environmental impact resulting from potential interactions with non-
target organisms.  On such grounds of ‘no significant risks’, non-target organisms 
warrant no monitoring. The risk assessment acknowledges ‘a limited potential 
environmental impact’ for insect resistance to the Bt toxin.  To ensure that the product 
poses negligible risk, ‘appropriate monitoring and risk-management plans have been 
developed and proposed in the context of product stewardship’.   
 
Bayer 
Bayer proposes to monitor gene flow and farmers’ practices. For Bayer’s oilseed rape 
tolerant to glufosinate (Basta), in files submitted to Germany and Belgium, the risk 
assessment identifies two potential adverse effects: glufosinate-tolerant volunteers and 
weeds, the latter from outcrossing.  Overall risk is assessed as nil, ‘taking into account 
the risk management strategies’.  On that basis, the company proposes case-specific 
monitoring to confirm its assumptions about the occurrence, impact and management of 
those potential effects.  It aims to demonstrate that these are fully manageable in a 
practical way in farmers’ fields.     
 
Implementing the plan will require complex arrangements across institutions.  Bayer 
mentions various ‘expert networks’ essential for the plan.  The company realizes that it 
will need good communication, cooperation and shared responsibility with farmers.  It 
will license the glufosinate-tolerance system to seed companies, rather than own and 
market the seed directly, so another layer of responsibility will need to be integrated in 
the monitoring plan.  
6   Other issues  
Commercialisation may depend upon other issues which are ambiguous in the Directive 
or which lie outside its formal scope.   
The DG-Environment Biotechnology Unit hosts Working Groups of CAs to discuss 
some of these issues, which include agro-environmental effects, antibiotic-resistant 
markers, traceability and labelling, and co-existence. 
 
Agro-environmental effects 
Like the original Deliberate Release Directive, the revised one allows broad scope for 
judgements on what potential effects would count as an ‘adverse effect’ if they were to 
happen, as well as judgements on the evidence needed to evaluate their likelihood.  
Examples include the potential spread of Bt insect resistance and herbicide-tolerance. 
Some companies and member states have requested clarity on the norms or baselines 
for unacceptable effects, as guidance for doing the risk assessment.  But it is difficult for 
regulators to set general criteria, especially on an EU-wide basis. 
 
Antibiotic-resistance markers 
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The safety of antibiotic-resistance marker (ARM) genes has been under debate since 
the mid-1990s.  Under the revised Directive, authorities must take a view ‘to identifying 
and phasing out antibiotic resistance markers in GMOs which may have adverse effects 
on human health and the environment’.  Some member states have interpreted this 
requirement as an eventual ban on ARMs in products to be commercialised, or even for 
field trials.  Some, for example the Netherlands and Denmark, have asked companies 
to exclude all ARMs, even those which did not previously generate controversy. 
Excluding ARMs is easier for products with a herbicide-tolerance gene, which can also 
serve as a marker for identifying GM plants in the lab.   
 
However, many of the 19 products awaiting an EU decision were constructed with an 
ARM.  When CAs act as rapporteur for a product, they attempt to anticipate possible 
objections or requests from other CAs.  For a Monsanto maize with an ARM which the 
German CA regards as safe, for example, it is proposing a time-limited registration until 
2004. 
 
Traceability and labelling 
Traceability and labelling rules are mentioned in the Preamble to the Directive but are 
not elaborated there.  Such rules have two main purposes: to facilitate monitoring of 
any adverse effects and linking these with a specific product; and to allow an informed 
consumer choice on whether to buy food derived from GM crops. The monitoring 
purpose explicitly involves precaution, by acknowledging uncertainty in risk 
assessment.  Consumer choice has an implicit precautionary rationale, in so far as 
consumers may regard safety as uncertain.    
 
Consumer choice depends upon specific criteria for labelling.  Within the Commission’s 
original framework of process-based labelling, compromises are being reached on two 
controversial criteria for adventitious presence of GM material in food.  In cases where 
the operator can demonstrate efforts to avoid such presence, the following thresholds 
are now being proposed: 
 
• 0.9% for EU-approved GM material 
• 0.5% (for a three-year transitional period) for GM material not EU-approved but 
favourably evaluated as safe by an EU scientific committee. 
An allowance for non-approved GM material has gained support for many reasons, e.g. 
to ensure that the overall agro-food chain is not disrupted by illegal traces of GM 
material. 
These proposals will be considered when drafted regulations go to a second reading at 
the Parliament plenary in early July. 
 
Industry maintains its previous arguments that process-based labelling would be 
unwarranted and unworkable, especially for the trans-Atlantic grain trade.  They fear 
that consumers will interpret a ‘GM’ label as ‘a skull and crossbones’, which may lead 
retailers to exclude GM ingredients.   
 
Co-existence 
Given the possible spread of GM volunteers or pollen, there have been long-standing 
arguments about whether transgene flow would irreversibly transform the environment 
or ‘contaminate’ conventional crops.  As a response, the term ‘co-existence’ expresses 
compromise measures to ensure freedom of choice to produce GM and non-GM crops.  
Some environmental NGOs have argued that co-existence would be difficult or 
impossible.  Industry, national governments and many farmers’ organizations seek 
feasible measures to make it possible.   
 
The debate involves several issues: the mutual responsibility of farmers to avoid 
adventitious contamination, the role of government in these arrangements, and the 
legal basis.  Member states have requested clarification on these issues.   For example, 
can adventitious presence be regarded as environmental damage, or only as an 
economic problem?  In that regard, the UK has invoked Article 16 of the Directive to 
justify statutory requirements for isolation distances, as requested by Wales, to provide 
an environment where non-GM crops can be grown.   
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According to a March 2003 proposal from the DG-Agriculture Commissioner, Franz 
Fischler, the EU would best be involved in coordination and advice only, so that each 
national authority could specify measures appropriate to its conditions.  Authorities 
could develop or clarify legislation to provide liability for economic damage from 
adventitious presence.  For new legislation, the constitutional basis could be Article 37 
of the EC Treaty, which authorises managing an economic risk from agriculture.  The 
Directive cannot be used to regulate adventitious GM presence because it would not be 
environmental harm, Fischler argues.  On that basis, local authorities may not simply 
use a ban to declare entire areas ‘GM-free’, as proposed in some member states, e.g. 
Austria.   
 
This proposal has drawn mixed responses.  The farmers’ association COPA welcomed 
the commitment to address liability in the case of economic loss to non-GM farmers.  
According to several environmental NGOs, however, the Commission was ‘dodging its 
responsibility’ to prevent genetic contamination in agriculture.   
 
EU and national studies have analysed the feasibility of co-existence measures, on the 
basis of thresholds in current draft legislation for GM labelling.  Current cultivation 
practices may be adequate to ensure co-existence for many crops, but extra measures 
would be needed for the three major crops awaiting commercialisation - maize, beet 
and especially oilseed rape  - in which case extra costs may be incurred.  The feasibility 
and costs to farmers will depend upon factors which lie somewhat beyond their control, 
for example GM thresholds in non-GM seeds, and the local extent of GM cultivation. 
 
Feasibility studies have developed predictive models which incorporate several types of 
knowledge, including information on seed banks, gene flow, cultivation practices, 
cropping systems and landscape patterns.  There are proposals to test and refine such 
models by obtaining more data, for example from intermingled farming patterns, scaled 
up production, outcrossing at longer distances, and monitoring the efficacy of isolation 
measures.  In such ways, co-existence extends expertise already developed for the risk 
assessment and risk management of GM crops. 
7   WTO case against the EU 
When the US government initiated a WTO case against the EU in May 2003, this step 
carried out a familiar threat.  In the past, such threats have backfired by intensifying 
European resentment towards both the USA and GM crops, thus making any 
accommodation more difficult.  For example, when the Commission proposed rules 
which could simplify GM-labelling requirements for grain shipments, some member 
states and MEPs rejected such proposals as concessions to the USA.  The 
Commission warned the US government that its threats were polarising the issues in 
Europe.  Likewise the European biotechnology industry foresaw that a WTO case would 
be counter-productive for progress towards commercialisation.   
 
The USA went ahead anyway, by attacking the EU Council moratorium as unjustified 
and unscientific, and even blaming Europe for blockages of food aid in Africa.  In 
response, the European Commission criticised the US action as ‘legally unwarranted, 
economically unfounded and politically unhelpful’: indeed, they argued that there is no 
moratorium, given that EU regulatory procedures are operating.  EuropaBio defended 
the EU regulatory system for GMOs as ‘transparent and workable’.   
 
This complaint to the WTO has high political stakes.  Apparently the US government 
has aims going far beyond GM crops in the EU, for example to deter similar restrictions 
elsewhere in the world, and to weaken stringent or precautionary measures in other 
regulatory sectors. US pressure could push the EU system towards commercial 
authorisation of GM products; or else it could backfire, for example by strengthening 
demands for greater precaution s and thus result in further delays. 
 
 
